Many researchers have emphasized the uniformity of voting across regions in
cleavages. According to Hechter, the political distinctiveness of Celtic areas in Britain is a product of the internal colonization of these areas (the periphery) by England (the core).' One consequence of internal colonization is a "cultural division of labor" (Hechter, 1975:38) . This results from the application of particularistic (e.g., cultural) criteria in the allocation of roles and resources. Following Barth (1969) and Gellner (1969) , Hechter (1975:39-40) argues that ethnicity may arise from the salience of cultural distinctions in the system of economic stratification. This cultural division of labor may occur at any (societal) level of structural differentiation according to the theory of reactive ethnic cleavages (Hechter, 1975:223) .
Although these two perspectives are clearly in conflict, both endorse an ana-I For a succint exposition of the concepts of core (or center) and periphery, see Galtung, 1971 :81-117; Wallerstein, 1974:347-57.
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lytical distinction between two bases of political action, class affinity and statusgroup affinity (see Weber, 1946:180-95 ). According to the developmental perspective, class cleavages in Britain have superseded status-based cleavages, while, according to the theory of reactive ethnic cleavages, the persistence of a status cleavage (Celtic sectionalism) represents the failure of class to become predominant. The present article shows that the contradiction between these two arguments is more apparent than real by demonstrating that Celtic sectionalism has roots in both class and status-group affinity.
REFORMULATION AND CRITIQUE

The Relationship between Class and Status-Group Affinity
The developmental perspective and the theory of reactive ethnic cleavages both adhere to Weber's distinction between class and status-group affinity. Both perspectives classify cleavages as class based or status based, and both support the notion that class affinity prevails at the expense of status-group affinity and vice versa. Cohen (1976 Cohen ( :1160 The analysis of the social bases of peripheral sectionalism is greatly facilitated by a repudiation of the simplistic dichotomous distinction between class and status-group affinity. Since peripheral areas are usually culturally distinct from core areas (that is, these areas are "culturally peripheral"), a status interpretation of peripheral sectionalism is enhanced. However, peripheral areas usually experience specialized economic development (as a consequence of the geographic division of labor-see Wallerstein, 1974:347-57), and the class structures of peripheral areas reflect this specialization. Class factors, then, may condition or limit the growth of peripheral sectionalism.
Linz (1973:69-72), for example, contrasts two peripheral areas in Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. Historically, the Basques have been united in their opposition to Castilian Spain, while the Catalonians have been divided between two class-based peripheral opposition groups. Linz (1973:69-72) argues that in the Basque country the PNV (Basque separatist party) was able to take a populistic stance "appealing to petty bourgeois anti-capitalist sentiments and supporting its own trade union movement" because in the Basque Provinces there are "many small entrepreneurs, highly skilled and paid workers, and well-distributed rural property." In 2 Hechter uses the term "peripheral sectionalism" to refer to culturally-based sectionalism, but his usage is inappropriate because periphery refers to a particular type of area, one that has experienced specialized economic development by a core. Peripheral sectionalism is used in this paper to refer to sectionalism based in these areas of specialized development, without regard to its specific source (i.e., structural versus cultural).
Catalonia, however, a "three-cornered conflict emerged among employers, workers, and [Castilian] national authorities." According to Linz, this class conflict in Catalonia limited the development of peripheral sectionalism.
Regional political tendencies in Norway also reflect differences in economic specialization and in class structure. Rokkan (1967:415) contrasts the different regions of Norway along these two dimensions. His fourfold typology is based on two dichotomies: hierarchical communities versus equalitarian communities and inland economy (agriculture and forestry) versus coastal economy (fishing). There are four possible combinations. Rokkan specifies the political tendencies associated with each type. In some regions, the pattern of political distinctiveness is the product of the highly uniform support of one class for a particular political party; in others, it is more the product of general cross-class support for a particular party.
These examples are suggestive of the great variety of peripheral political responses. They also suggest that class factors are frequently important in the origin and evolution of these responses. This emphasis is very different from the emphases of existing treatments of regional factors in British politics. These arguments are extreme in their emphases, one supporting the idea of regional homogeneity based on class, the other maintaining the failure of class politics in peripheral areas and the consequent persistence of a status-based cleavage.
The Social Bases of Celtic Sectionalism
The specialized economic development of Scotland and Wales has been primarily industrial. This industrialization has led to the creation of a large, industrial working class in the Celtic periphery. Thus, industrial conflict has been more intense in the periphery than elsewhere in Britain (see, e.g., Pelling, 1958; 1968 Butler and Stokes present data on Britain showing the cross-tabulation of class and political choice for each region. They note a strong, consistent relationship between class and party support in all areas of Britain. This is qualified, however, by a distinction between two areas within Britain, the "depressed north" and the "expanding south" (Butler and Stokes, 1969:142). They find that in the north the working class is much more unanimous in its support of the Labour Party. Noting that the relative size of the working class is also much greater in the north, they hypothesize that class has a contextual effect. Thus, the larger the working class is in an area, the greater the probability that working-class individuals will support the Labour Party. Conversely, the greater the size of the middle class, the greater the probability that middle-class individuals will support the Conservative Party. They demonstrate these arguments with scattergram analyses of the proportion of the working class supporting Labour and the proportion of the constituency which is working-class ( (Hechter, 1975:320 reasons not directly addressed by the theories discussed here. For example, an area might consistently and uniformly support a particular party because of the superior organization of the party in that area. When political subdivisions are historically defined, as in the case of Britain, this pattern is particularly favored.
To examine national-regional effects, it is necessary to include in the analysis an indicator for the counties of Scotland and Wales. This can be accomplished by computing two dummy variables, one coded "1" for Scottish counties and "O" for all others, and the other coded " 1" for Welsh counties and "O" for all others. The inclusion of these dummy variables allows a more rigorous test of the reactive ethnicity argument.
Cultural peripherality (measured here as percentage Nonconformists) varies within and between national regions. Thus, Wales and Scotland experience relatively higher levels of Nonconformity than England (Hechter, 1975 :321-2), but Nonconformity also varies within Scotland and Wales. It is necessary, therefore, to control for national-regional effects since Nonconformity is more concentrated in Scotland and Wales. The omission of these controls could permit the effects of uniform national-regional differences to be attributed to Nonconformity. Table 1 
ANALYSIS Political Disposition
Degree of Sectional Response
The skew of the residuals from the regression of party support on class variables (see Table 2 ) shows the degree of sectional response. A strong skew indicates the possibility of sectionalism because (1) the largest residuals should obtain for sectional counties since these counties should conform least to national patterns of party support and (2) the largest residuals should be all positive or all negative since a single pattern of political distinctiveness is expected.8 Thus, for example, if Hechter's (1975) argument is correct, Conservative political disposition should manifest a strong negative skew; Labour political disposition, a strong positive skew. This would obtain because Hechter argues that Celtic sectionalism has found expression in an antiConservative, pro-Labour posture.
The findings for Conservative disposition are much more consistent than those for Labour disposition. For all but two of the eight elections analyzed, Conservative disposition manifests a strong negative skew. The skew is much stronger after World War I because the Liberal Party remained strong in isolated pockets (mostly at the expense of the Conservative Party). The data for the elections of 1892 and 1900, however, show only very slight skew. These anomalies are probably due to the split between the Liberals and the Liberal Unionists during this period.9 7 Since there is a great deal of multicollinearity among these measures of class composition, it is hazardous to interpret the regression coefficients. 8 Of course, these measures of skew would be inappropriate if there were two distinct pockets of peripheral sectionalism, with one expressing its sectionalism via strong support for a national party and the other via strong opposition to the same party.
9 Votes for the Liberal Unionists have been included as Conservative votes since the Liberal Unionists were allied with the Conservatives. In some areas of the Celtic periphery there was little or no traditional Liberal opposition to the Liberal Unionists. Consequently, these areas appear to be pro-Conservative when they are, in fact, anti-Irish nationalist. Overall, these data give moderate support to the argument that some sort of sectionalism (anti-Conservatism) has persisted in British politics. For Labour disposition, the greatest skew is negative, thus contradicting the reactive ethnicity argument that the Labour Party has served as an outlet for sectionalism. Little, if any, skew is associated with the residuals from the 1931 and 1966 regressions. The one clearly positive skew is for 1924, but this skew is very small in contrast to the large negative Conservative skew for that same election. Overall, there appears to be little support for the argument that the Labour Party has served as a vehicle for sectionalism.
The Social Bases of Sectionalism
The specific nature of sectionalism can be ascertained by regressing Conservative and Labour disposition on cultural peripherality (percentage Noncomformists) and the two regional dummy variables (see Table 3 ). Conservative disposition is analyzed at eight points in time; Labour disposition, at four points. The findings nere support those in Table 2 Alford examined only Labour Party support; he found no significant pattern of political regionalism. He did find higher levels of class voting in Scotland and Wales, but he concluded that the higher levels of class voting in these areas reinforced his conclusion that class alone is important in Britain. 13 These findings support the argument that (1) status-based peripheral opposition originates among the local dominant strata of a peripheral area and (2) such opposition is arrested, or at least limited by class cleavages. Thus, emphasis on local culture in peripheral areas may be based in both class and status factors; it cannot be explained simply by one or the other.
The fact that core-periphery conflict originates in and is limited by class cleavages suggests that the primary theoretical question is not whether peripheral opposition is a product of economic gaps between regions. Of greater concern is the relationship between status-group affinity and class affinity in peripheral areas. Some class cleavages in peripheral areas have been transformed into unified opposition to a core area. The evidence I have presented here, however, suggests that the class cleavages that may accompany industrial development (as in Scotland and Wales) hinder the extension of status-group affinity. Thus, the specialized, industrial development of these areas may have stymied the formation of Scottish and Welsh "nations."
Though Hechter misspecified the nature of Labour support in Scotland and Wales, his contrast between Ireland, on the one hand, and Scotland and Wales, on the other, is consistent with this view:
Irish secession is best explained by the particular mode of dependent development which emerged in Ireland during the period 1846-1921. This involved the evolution of a relatively capital intensive agrarian regional economy which did not lead to the substantial inter-regional [working class] organizational affiliations as occurred following the highly restricted industrial development of Wales and Scotland. (Hechter, 1975 :292, emphasis added) Indeed, it is the particular mode of dependent industrial development in Scotland and Wales which best explains the type of (limited) peripheral opposition illustrated in the analysis above.
